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Abstract
At each point in time a decision maker must choose a decision. The payoff in a period
from the decision chosen depends on the decision as well as the state of the world
that obtains at that time. The difficulty is that the decision must be made in advance
of any knowledge, even probabilistic, about which state of the world will obtain. A
range of problems from a variety of disciplines can be framed in this way. In this
paper we survey the main results obtained as well as some of their applications.
1 Introduction
At each (discrete) point in time a decision maker must choose a decision. The loss (or
reward) from the decision chosen depends on the decision and the state of the world
that obtains at that time. If dt is the decision chosen at time t and Xt the state of
the world at time t, the loss incurred is L(dt, Xt) and is non-negative and bounded.
The catch is that the decision must be made prior to knowing anything about which
state of the world will obtain. The decision makers goal is to select a sequence of
decisions {dt}t≥0 so that her total loss,
T∑
t=0
L(dt, Xt)
is small. We call this the on-line decision problem (ODP). The decision makers
goal as we have described it is not well defined. We return to this issue later in
the section. ODP’s are different from many of the on-line problems considered in
computer science in that the loss incurred in each period does not depend on decisions
taken in earlier periods. The interested reader should consult [23] for a brief survey
of work on on-line propblems in computer science.
A range of problems from a variety of disciplines can be framed as ODP’s. One
example of an ODP that has received a lot of attention is the problem of predicting
a sequence of 0’s and 1’s so as to minimize the number of incorrect predictions (see
for example [5] or [28]). In this case there are two possible decisions to be made
in each time period, predict a 1 or predict a 0, i.e., dt = 0, 1. In each time period
there are just two possible states of the world, 0 or 1, i.e., Xt = 0, 1. The loss
function will be L(dt, Xt) = |dt−Xt|. Other examples will be mentioned in the body
of the paper when appropriate. ODP’s have been the subject of study for over 40
years now in Statistics, Computer Science, Game Theory, Information Theory and
Finance. Furthermore, investigations in these different disciplines have been pursued
quite independently. One measure of this is that one particular result (which we will
describe) has been proved independently on at least four different occasions within
this 40 year span!
We turn now to the important issue of what the decision makers goal is. Earlier
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we said it was to minimize the total loss. The problem is that the loss will depend on
the particular sequence of states of the world that transpire. For example, consider
the 0-1 prediction problem mentioned earlier. Here is a naive prediction scheme:
predict 1 every time. If the sequence that obtains is all 1, then we would be in the
pleasant position of having the smallest possible loss, zero. Does this mean that this
prediction scheme is a good one? Clearly not. If the sequence being predicted had
been all 0’s, the scheme would definitely be useless. What is needed is a scheme that
generates low average losses against a variety of sequences of states of the world. One
natural way of operationalizing the robustness requirement is to focus on
max
T∑
t=0
L(dt, Xt).
Here the maximum is over all possible sequences of states of the world. The goal is
to find a scheme for selecting decisions that minimizes this last quantity. This goal,
while well defined, is not useful. Consider the the 0-1 prediction problem again. For
every deterministic prediction scheme there is a sequence of 0’s and 1’s for which the
scheme never makes a correct prediction. So, the maximum over all sequences of the
time averaged loss for every deterministic prediction scheme is 1.
If one is not wedded to deterministic prediction schemes, there is an obvious way
out and that is to randomize. Then,
∑T
t=0 L(dt, Xt) becomes a random variable. In
this case, one natural definition of robustness is:
maxE[
T∑
t=0
L(dt, Xt)],
where the expectation is with respect to the probabilities induced by the randomized
scheme. In this paper we restrict our attention to randomized schemes only.
Unfortunately, the best that can be achieved by a randomized scheme is an average
loss of 1/2 per round. This is obtained when the decision maker randomizes 50/50
on each round. Since finding a scheme that has maxE[
∑T
t=0 L(dt, Xt)] less than T/2
is impossible, an alternative has been (see for example [5], [7] or [12]) to measure
the success of a decision scheme by comparison with other schemes. Imagine that we
have a family F of decision schemes already available. Let S be a new scheme. One
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would view S as being attractive if its total loss is ‘comparable’ to the total loss of
the best scheme in F no matter what sequence of states of the world obtain.
The comparability idea judges a scheme on the basis of a notion of external valid-
ity; i.e., is it as good as some other scheme? In this paper we introduce an alternative
to this, that judges a scheme on the basis of its internal coherence. We also estab-
lish a close connection between this notion of internal coherence and one version of
comparability, allowing us to derive several known results in a unified way.
2 Regret
Regret is what we feel when we realize that we would have been better off had we
done something else. A basic requirement of any scheme is that it should avoid or at
least reduce the regret that will be felt. Before we give an explicit definition, some
notation.1 Let D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn} be the set of possible decisions that could be
made in each time period.2 Denote the loss incurred at time t from taking decision dj
by Ljt . We assume through out that losses are bounded, in fact, to save on notation,
assume that Ljt ≤ 1 for all dj ∈ D and t ≥ 0. Notice we suppress the dependence on
the state of the world that obtains at time t.
Any scheme (deterministic or randomized) for selecting decisions can be described
in terms of the probability, wjt , of choosing decision j at time t. Let wt denote the
n-tuple of probabilities at time t. Remember, wt must be derived using only data
obtained upto time t− 1.
Consider now a scheme S for selecting decisions. Let {wt}t≥0 be the probability
weights implied by the scheme. Then, the expected loss from using S, L(S), over T
periods will be
T∑
t=1
∑
dj∈D
wjtL
j
t .
Imagine we have applied the scheme S for T periods. Now, we look back and
1There can be many ways to operationalize the notion of regret, we offer only one.
2The analysis can easily be extended to the case of different sets of decisions at each time period
at the cost of increased notation.
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review our performance. Had we done things differently could we have wound up
with a smaller loss? Specifically, at every time t that the scheme S said we should
pick decision dj with probability w
j
t had we picked decision di would we have done
better? Had we done so, our expected loss would be
L(S)− (
T∑
t=1
wjtL
j
t −
T∑
t=1
wjtL
i
t).
If the quantity
T∑
t=1
wjtL
j
t −
T∑
t=1
wjtL
i
t
were positive, than, clearly we would have been better off. So, we feel regret at having
used decision dj in stead of decision di. For this reason we define the regret incurred
by S from using decision dj to be
RjT (S) =
∑
i∈D
max{0, (
T∑
t=1
wjt (L
j
t − Lit))}.
The regret from using S will be
RT (S) =
∑
j∈D
RjT (S).
The scheme S will have the no-regret property if its expected regret is small, i.e.,
RT (S) = o(T ).
Notice that a no-regret scheme has a (time) average regret that goes to zero as T →∞,
i.e., RT (S)/T → 0. The existence of a no-regret scheme was first established in [13].
The proof we describe here is due to Hart and Mas-Collel [22] and makes use of David
Blackwell’s approachability theorem. For completeness we include a statement and
proof of the approachability theorem in an appendix to the paper.So as to motivate
the proof we consider the case |D| = 2 first.
2.1 The case |D| = 2
Our goal is to show that there is a scheme S such that RT (S) = o(T ). Actually we will
prove something stronger. That is, there is a scheme S such that maxj R
j
T (S) = o(T ).
If this last statement is true it will follow that RT (S) = o(T ).
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Given any two decisions di and dj, define the pairwise regret of of switching from
dj to di to be
Rj→iT (S) =
T∑
t=1
wjtL
j
t −
T∑
t=1
wjtL
i
t
Since Ri→iT (S) is zero, if |D| = 2 we only have two non-trivial component regrets,
R1→0T (S) and R
0→1
T (S). If we can choose the decisions in each round so as to force
the time average of R1→0T (S) and R
0→1
T (S) to go to zero we are done.
To use the approachability theorem we need to define both a game and a target
set. In the game the decision maker has one strategy for each decision. The payoff
from using strategy “0” is the vector (L0t − L1t , 0) while the vector payoff from using
strategy “1” is (0, L1t −L0t ). Suppose the decision maker uses a scheme S that selects
strategy “0” with probability wt in round t. Then, her time averaged (vector)payoff
after T rounds will be
((1/T )
T∑
t=1
wt[L
0
t − L1t ], (1/T )
T∑
t=1
(1− wt)[L1t − L0t ])
which is just (R0→1T (S)/T,R
1→0
T (S)/T ). Given what we wish to prove, the target set
is simply the non-positive orthant . Figure 1 shows a picture of this situation.
Blackwell’s Approachability theorem tells us that if the decision maker can find
a strategy which forces the vector payoff (in expectation) to be on the same side of
the line l as the target set, she can force the long term average of the payoffs to be
arbitrarily close to the target set. If the average of the payoffs is already in the target
set, we are done.
We now show that it is possible to force the next vector payoff to lie on the
same side of line l as the target set. After T rounds the average payoff is the vector
(R0→1T (S)/T,R
1→0(S)/T ). Thus the equation of the line l will be [R0→1T (S)/T ]x +
[R1→0T (S)/T ]y = 0.
If the decision maker chooses strategy 0 with probability p and strategy 1 with
probability 1 − p in round T + 1, the payoff (in expectation) will be the vector
(p[L0T+1 − L1T+1], (1 − p)[L1T+1 − L0T+1). It suffices to choose p so that this point lies
on the line l, i.e.,
p(R1→0T (S))
+ = (1− p)(R0→1T (S))+ (1)
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To verify that the value of of p that solves this equation is between 0 and 1, we solve
the equation:
p =
(R0→1T (S))
+
(R1→0T (S))+ + (R
0→1
T (S))
+
. (2)
2.2 General case
In the general case, where |D| = k, there are a total of k(k − 1) non-trivial pairwise
regret terms. As before we will identify a scheme S such that Ri→jT (S) = o(T ) for all
i and all j. Such a scheme will obviously have the no regret property.
The proof mimics the |D| = 2 case. The decision maker has one strategy for
every decision. The payoff from playing strategy j in round T is the vector whose ith
component is LjT − LiT . The target set is G = {x|(∀i)xi ≤ 0}.
Call the average of the vector payoffs obtained so far a = (Rj→iT (S)/T )i,j. Let c
be the point in G closest to a. Clearly ci = a
−
i . Thus the vector a− c is just a+i .
In the next round we want to choose a probability vector wT+1, so that the ex-
pected vector payoff will lie on the plane l which is perpendicular to a − c. Thus,
wT+1 must satisfy: ∑
i,j
wiT+1(L
i
t − Ljt)(Ri→jT (S))+ = 0 (3)
Splitting it into two sums:
∑
i,j
wiT+1L
i
t(R
i→j
T (S))
+ −∑
i,j
wiT+1L
j
t(R
i→j
T (S))
+ = 0 (4)
Changing the indices of the second sum:
∑
i,j
wiT+1L
i
t(R
i→j
T (S))
+ −∑
j,i
wjT+1L
i
t(R
j→i
T (S))
+ = 0 (5)
we get: ∑
i,j
Lit(w
i
T+1(R
i→j
T (S))
+ − wjT+1(Rj→iT (S))+) = 0 (6)
Since the Lit’s are arbitrary, we must have for each i that:
∑
j
wiT+1(R
i→j
T (S))
+ − wjT+1(Rj→iT (S))+ = 0 (7)
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To complete the argument it suffices to show that this system of equations admits a
non-negative solution.
Let A be a matrix defined as follows:
aij = R
j→i
T (S) (8)
for all i 6= j, and
aii = −
∑
j 6=i
Ri→jT (S). (9)
Notice that the row sums of A are all zero. Equation (7) is equivalent to Ax = 0. We
need to show that the system Ax = 0 admits a non-trivial non-negative solution.3
Let A′ be the matrix obtained from A as follows:
a′ij = aij/B
where B = maxi,j |aij|. Notice that |a′ij| ≤ 1 and
∑
i a
′
ij = 0. Let P = A
′ + I.
Then, P will be a non-negative row stochastic matrix. Hence there is a non-negative
probability vector x such that Px = x (since we don’t require that x be unique, we
don’t need any restrictions on the matrix P ). Since P = A′ + I we deduce that
A′x+ Ix = x
⇒ A′x = 0
⇒ Ax = 0
The vector x is the required distribution. Further, it can easily be found by Gaussian
elimination.
With some additional effort one can extract the rate of convergence of RT (S). It
is O(
√
T ) and this is best possible. However for special cases it can be improved.
2.3 Calibrated Forecasts
Probability forecasting is the act of assigning probabilities to an uncertain event.
There are many criteria for judging the effectiveness of a probability forecast. The
3The solution can be normalized to turn it into a probability vector.
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one that we consider is called calibration. In this section we will show how the
existence of a no-regret decision scheme implies the existence of a close to calibrated
probability forecast. This was first established in [13].
For simplicity, assume that we are forecasting a sequence of 0-1’s, i.e., there are
just two states of the world. LetX be a sequence of 0-1’s whose ith element isXi. Fix a
forecasting scheme F and let fi be the probability forecast of a 1 in period i generated
by this scheme. Note that fi can be any number between 0 and 1. Let nt(p,X, F )
be the number of times upto time t that the scheme forecasted a probability p of a 1.
Let ρt(p,X, F ) be the fraction of those times that it actually rained. In other words,
nt(p,X, F ) ≡
t∑
i=1
Ifi=p
ρt(p,X, F ) ≡
t∑
i=1
Ifi=pXi
nt(p,X, F )
where I is the indicator function. The calibration score of F with respect to the
sequence X of 0-1’s after t periods is
Ct(F,X) =
∑
p
(ρt(p,X, F )− p)2 nt(p,X, F )
t
.
Ideally, one would like an F so that Ct(F,X) = 0 for all t and X, i.e., F is
calibrated wrt all sequences X. This is impossible,4 so, we settle for something less:
find a randomized F such that for any  > 0 there is a t sufficiently large such that
E(Ct(F,X)) < , where the expectation is with respect to the probabilities induced
by F .5
We restrict F to choosing a forecast from the set {0, 1/k, 2/k, . . . , (k − 1)/k, 1}.
Let wjt be the probability that F selects the forecast j/k in period t. Hence the
expected number of times that F chooses j/k as a forecast upto time t is
∑t
s=1w
j
s.
Let
• n˜t( ik ) ≡
∑t
s=1w
i
s and
4Particularly if F is a deterministic scheme.
5In [13] it is shown how to choose F so that the random variable Ct(F,X) itself converges to zero
in probability.
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• ρ˜t( ik ) ≡
∑t
s=1
wisIXs
n˜t(
i
k
)
.
Then, the expected calibration score of F is
C˜t ≡
k∑
j=0
n˜t(
j
k
)
t
(
ρ˜t(
j
k
)− j
k
)2
.
Consider the following loss function: Ljt = (Xt− jk )2. We claim that if F is chosen
to be a no-regret decision scheme with respect to the loss function just defined, then
C˜t → 0 as t→∞. The idea is to show that C˜t = O(Rt(F )/t).
Observe that
n˜t(
i
k
)
(
ρ˜t(
i
k
)− i
k
)2
= at(i, i)− at(i, j) + n˜t( ik )
(
ρ˜t(j)− jk
)2
(10)
≤ at(i, i)−min
j
at(i, j) +
n˜t(
i
k
)
4k2
(11)
≤ ∑
j
max{at(i, i)− at(i, j), 0}+ n˜t(
i
k
)
4k2
(12)
Where (10) follows by noting that at(i, j) =
∑
sw
i
s(Xs − ρ˜t(j))2 + n˜t( ik )( jk − ρ˜t(j))2.
Where (11) follows because j/k will be within 1/(2k) of ρ˜t(j). Where (12) follows
because at least one of the terms in the sum equals at(i, i)−minj at(i, j). Summing
both sides of (12) and noting that
∑
i n˜t(
i
k
) = t we see that tC˜(t) ≤ Rt(F ) + t/(4k2).
Sergiu Hart [20] has given a charming alternative proof, based on the minimax
theorem, of the existence of a close to calibrated forecast. Unfortunately, Hart’s proof
does not lead to an efficient algorithm for generating such a forecast. Fudenberg and
Levine [17] also give a (different) proof based on the minimax theorem. Their proof
is longer than Harts’ but has the virtue of leading to an efficient algorithm for finding
a close to calibrated forecast.
3 Comparability
For any decision scheme S let LT (S) be the (expected) total loss from using S upto
time T .6 Let F be a collection of different decision schemes. A decision scheme, S,
6The expectation is with respect to the randomization induced by S.
9
is said to be comparable to F if
LT (S) ≤ min
P∈F
LT (P ) + o(T )
for all sequences of states of the world. So, for large T , the time averaged loss from
using S is almost as good as the average loss of the best of the schemes in F .7
Given any finite set F of decision schemes we show how to construct a decision
scheme that is comparable to F . Consider the case when F consists of just two
schemes A and B. Let LAt and L
B
t be the loss incurred by using schemes A and B
in time t respectively. Let C be a scheme that follows A in time t with probability
wt and scheme B with probability 1 − wt. In effect, C is a decision scheme whose
decision set consists of just two options, do A or do B. Then,
LT (C) =
T∑
t=1
[wtL
A
t + (1− wt)LBt ].
Theorem 1 If C is a no-regret scheme, then, C is comparable to {A,B}.
Proof Without loss of generality we may assume that LT (A) ≤ LT (B). The
regret associated with C is
RT (C) = max{
T∑
t=1
wt(L
A
t − LBt ), 0}+ max{
T∑
t=1
(1− wt)(LBt − LAt ), 0}.
Since RT (C) = o(T ), it follows that
max{
T∑
t=1
wt(L
A
t − LBt ), 0}+ max{
T∑
t=1
(1− wt)(LBt − LAt ), 0} = o(T ).
Thus
max{
T∑
t=1
(1− wt)(LBt − LAt ), 0} ≤ o(T ).
Since max{x, 0} ≥ x we deduce that
T∑
t=1
(1− wt)(LBt − LAt ) ≤ o(T ).
Adding
∑T
t=1wtL
A
t to both sides of this last inequality we obtain the required result.2
7Some authors, [25] and [10], have studied the ratio LT (S)minP∈F LT (P ) . However, bounds on the ratio
can be derived from bounds on the difference LT (S)−minP∈F LT (P ).
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Given that C is a no-regret forecast we have from section 2.2 that
LT (C)−min{LT (A), LT (B)} = O(
√
T ).
This bound is best possible, [5]. However, for particular loss functions or states of
the world, it can be improved.
To extend the result to a set F of more than two decision schemes is easy. Start
with two schemes, A and B ∈ F and use the theorem to construct a scheme Z0 that
is comparable to the two of them. Now, take a third scheme C in F and produce
a scheme Z1 comparable to Z0 and C. Notice that Z1 is comparable to {A,B,C}.
Continuing in this way we obtain:
Theorem 2 Given any finite set of decision schemes F , there exists a (randomized)
decision scheme S comparable to F .
Interestingly, Theorem 2 has been proved many times in the last 40 years. A
review of the titles of some of the papers that contain proofs of Theorem 2 (or special
cases) explains why:
• Controlled Random Walks,
• On Pseudo-games,
• A Randomized Rule for Selecting Forecasts,
• Approximating the bayes risk in Repeated Plays,
• Aggregating Strategies, and
• Universal Portfolios.
The first proof we are aware of is due to James Hannan [19] where it arises in a game
theoretic context.8
8We thank Aldo Rustichini, for leading us to the paper by Hannan. Alas, it came to our attention
only after we had reinvented the wheel in [12]
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3.1 An Application to Game Theory
Consider a two player game which will be played repeatedly, where the ‘loss’ to the
row player from playing strategy i when the column player plays her strategy j is aij.
Suppose that the row player knew the proportion, yj of times that the column player
will play her strategy j. Knowing this, the smallest (average) loss that the row player
can receive is
v(y) = min
i
∑
j
aijyj.
Hannan [19] showed that asymptotically, the row player can achieve v(y) without
knowing y ahead of time using randomization and the history of past plays. Call this
the Hannan theorem. Let us see how to derive it using Theorem 2.9
Our set of decision schemes, F , will be the set of strategies that the row player
has. The ith scheme in F will be to choose the ith strategy in each round. By Theorem
2 there is a scheme S such that
min
P∈F
LT (P ) ≤ LT (S) ≤ min
P∈F
LT (P ) + o(T ).
Dividing by T and letting T →∞ we conclude that
LT (S)→ minP∈F LT (P )
T
.
However, minP∈F LT (P )
T
is just v(y), where y is the empirical average of the column
players plays.
Notice that Theorem 2 does not require that the column player have a finite
number of strategies or that the a′ijs be non-random. Interestingly, Theorem 2 can
be derived from Hannan’s theorem itself. For a proof we refer the reader to [15]. For
this reason we will sometimes refer to Theorem 2 as Hannan’s theorem.
It is also possible to derive Hannan’s theorem using the existence of a close to
calibrated forecast. The row player makes probability forecasts of the column player
playing each of her strategies and then plays a best response. If the forecast is close
9Hannan’s proof required that the row player know the entire game matrix ahead of time. By
relying on Theorem 2 we shall see that this is not necessary. It is enough for the player to know the
column of the matrix corresponding to the strategy played by column.
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to calibrated, rows time averaged payoffs converge to v(y). This proof requires that
the row player know all of the column players strategies.
Before continuing with our history of Theorem 2, we mention one interesting
consequence of it for zero-sum games. In this case aij is the loss to the row player
and the gain to the column player. Let v be the value of this zero sum game. By the
easy part of the minimax theorem
LT (S)
T
≥ v ≥ v(y).
Since S is comparable to F it follows that
LT (S)
T
− v → 0
as T → ∞. The actual rate of convergence (first established by Hannan) is 1√
T
and
this is best possible (see [5]). Thus, any algorithm for constructing a comparable
decision scheme is an algorithm for finding the value of a zero sum game, and so for
solving a linear program. For a detailed treatment see [15].
A short time after Hannan announced his result, David Blackwell [2], showed how
Hannan’s theorem could be obtained as a corollary of his approachability theorem,
[3]. To use the theorem one needs to define an auxiliary game with vector valued
payoffs and a target set. If the row player chooses strategy i and the column player
chooses strategy j, the payoff is an n + 1-vector with a 1 in the jth position, aij in
the (n + 1)st position and zeros everywhere else. Here n is the number of strategies
of the column player. The target set, G is the set of vectors, y, in <n+1 such that
1.
∑n
j=1 yj = 1,
2. yn+1 ≤ ∑nj=1 aijyj for all i, and,
3. yj ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
If y is the vector that represents the proportion of times the column player has played
each of each his strategies, then the vector (y, v(y)) is in the target set G. So, to prove
Hannan’s theorem it is sufficient to show that the this target set is approachable.
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Independently but 9 years later in 1968, Banos [4] also derived Hannan’s theorem.
The proof given is quite complicated but proves it for the case where the payoffs are
random variables and the row player knows only her won pure strategies. A decade
after that, Megiddo [27] also proposed and proved Hannan’s theorem, this time 23
years after the original. It is clear from the comments in that paper that Megiddo
became aware of the paper by Banos after his own paper was in press. Megiddo’s proof
is simpler than Banos’ but still quite elaborate when compared with the arguments
given here.
It is clear that the Hannan theorem disappeared from the collective memory of
the Game Theory community, because, in 1994, it was (re)-discovered again by Fu-
denberg and Levine [17]. The proof given is different from the ones given by Hannan,
Blackwell, Banos and Megiddo. In their scheme strategies are played in proportion to
their payoffs with exponential weights. This, as we explain later, has been the most
popular method for proving Hannan’s theorem.10 In a sequel to their 1994 paper,
Fudenberg and Levine [18] investigate a generalization of Hannan’s theorem. Instead
of asking if the player could do as well as if she knew the frequency of outcomes in
advance, we could divide the samples into subsamples, and ask if the player could
do as well as if she knew the frequencies of the subsamples, and was told in advance
which subsample the observation was going to be drawn from. They give a positive
result using a variation of the regret idea introduced in the previous section.
The most recent (re)-discovery of Hannan’s theorem in a game theory context we
aware of is the 1995 paper by Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund and Schapire [1]. This
last paper is of interest because it provides other applications of Theorem 2 as well
as some refinements. In particular they extend Hannan’s theorem to the case where
the row player knows only the payoff from the strategy played in each round, thus
providing for an on-line version of the classical bandit problem.11
10We note that the important ingredients for a proof of Hannan’s theorem can also be found in
[9]. That paper does not contain an explicit statement of the theorem or proof.
11A similar result can be found in [12].
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3.2 An Application to Sequence Prediction
A problem that has received a great deal of attention in the computer science literature
is that of predicting a sequence of 0’s and 1’s with ‘few’ mistakes. The problem has
stimulated a number of proofs of special cases of Theorem 2. All have involved the
use of an algorithm that chooses to predict 0 or 1 in proportion to their payoffs
with exponential weights. The exponential weighted algorithm just alluded to was
introduced by Littlestone and Warmuth [25], Desantis, Markowski and Wegman [8],
Feder, Mehrav and Gutman [10] and Vovk [28] at about the same time. Vovk [28]
shows how the exponential weighted algorithm can be used to prove Theorem 2 for
any bounded loss function (but the states of the world are either 0 or 1).
Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, Helmbold, Haussler, Schapire and Warmuth [5] study the
special case of the absolute loss function12 establishing the best possible rates of
convergence under various partial information scenarios as a function of T and the
number of schemes in F . For example, the decision maker knows an upper bound on
the total loss of the best scheme in F or knows the length of the game, T .
In the case where the state of the world in each period is not binary, Littlestone
and Warmuth [25] and Kivinen and Warmuth [24] show that Theorem 2 holds, but
only for particular loss function. Within this literature, Theorem 2 as we have stated
it was obtained by Chung [6] and Freund and Schapire [14].
We close this section with a pleasing implication of Theorem 2.13 In any sequence
of 0’s and 1’s let ut be the fraction of 1’s that have appeared upto time t. Suppose
you have been predicting the next element of the sequence. Let ft be the expected
fraction of incorrect predictions you have made upto time t.
Theorem 3 For any sequence of 0’s and 1’s there is a way to predict the next element
in the sequence so that
ft → min{ut, 1− ut}
12The loss at time t is |pt−XT |, where the pt is the prediction at time t and Xt = 0, 1 is the state
of the world.
13We believe this was first observed by David Blackwell.
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as t→∞.
Proof Define the loss function Lt at time time t to take the value 1 if an incorrect
prediction has been made and 0 otherwise. Let A be the decision/prediction scheme
that predicts a 1 at each time and B the scheme that predicts a 0 every time. Clearly,
Lt(A)
t
= 1− ut and Lt(B)t = ut. By Theorem 2 there is a scheme C such that
Lt(C) ≤ min{Lt(A), Lt(B)}+O(t).
Divide through by t and the theorem is proved.2
Thus, the fraction of incorrect predictions will never exceed a half and could be
lower if there is a bias in the sequence towards 0’s or 1’s.
3.3 Statistics
Within statistics Foster [11] proves a version of Theorem 2 for the case of a quadratic
loss function and two possible states of the world. The 1993 paper by Foster and
Vohra [13] contains Theorem 2 in the form stated here. The proof is motivated by
statistical considerations which we outline here.
Once can view the average losses accumulated thus far by the two schemes A and
B as sample means. Presumably the sample means should tell one something about
the true mean. So, the question becomes this: when is the difference in sample means
sufficiently large for us to conclude that scheme A (or B) should be the one to follow
on the next round? Usually such a question is answered by examining how many
standard deviations one sample mean is from the other. In our case, we can make no
appeal to the central limit theorem to posit a distribution and so compute a standard
deviation. Even so, lets suppose that the losses incurred by each scheme on each
round are independent random variables. Since the losses are bounded above by 1,
we would expect the difference in the average loss of the two schemes after T rounds
to be O(1/T ) and the standard deviation of that difference to be O(1/
√
T ).
If the difference in the average losses of the two schemes was less than O(1/
√
T ) we
would conclude that there is no difference between the two schemes and so randomly
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select which scheme to follow on the next round.
If the difference in the average losses of the two schemes exceeded O(1/
√
T ), we
would conclude that one scheme was superior to the other and use it on the next
round.
This is essentially the scheme proposed in [13]. In the case where the difference
in the average losses of the two schemes is less than O(1/
√
T ), one randomizes over
the two schemes with probability (1/2 − , 1/2 + ) where  is a small number that
depends on the average difference of the accumulated losses thus far.
3.4 An Application to Finance
In this section we show how Theorem 2 can be used to obtain a result first derived in
[7] by other means. Along the way we will describe a trick for generalizing Theorem
2, under certain conditions, to the case where F consists of a continuum of decision
schemes.
Imagine a financial world consisting of just two stocks A and B. Let At and Bt
be the value of stocks A and B, respectively, at time t. We assume that At and Bt
are bounded. To avoid extra notation suppose that A0 = B0 = 1 and that our initial
wealth is 1 as well. The return on stock A at time t will be At
At−1
. So, the growth rate
at time t of stock A will be ln( At
At−1
). Since
At = Π
t
r=1
Ar
Ar−1
it follows that lnAt
t
will be the average growth rate of stock A over t periods.14 We
will use Theorem 2 (with inequalities reversed to account for gains rather than losses)
with F consisting of the following two schemes: buy and hold stock A only and buy
and hold stock B. Interpret probabilities of choosing each of these schemes as the
proportion of our current wealth that should be invested in each stock. In particular,
if wt is the ‘probability’ of picking stock A at time t, the growth rate at time t will
be wt ln
At
At−1
+ (1 − wt) ln BtBt−1 . Given this, we can construct a changing portfolio of
14In finance this is called the internal rate of return.
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the two stocks, C, say, whose value at time t, Ct satisfies:
lnCt
t
≥ max{ lnAt
t
,
lnBt
t
} −O( 1√
t
).
In effect, the average growth rate of C is asymptotically equal to the better of the
growth rates of A and B.15 It is not hard to see that this result holds for any finite
number of stocks.
The previous result shows only that we can, without advance knowledge of the
future, match the average growth rate of the best stock. Could we, without being
clairvoyant, match the growth rate of the best portfolio of the two stocks?16 The
answer is a qualified yes. We can match the growth rate of the best portfolio from
the class of constant portfolios. Such portfolios maintain a constant proportion of
their wealth in each stock. For example, in each period maintain one third of the
value of the portfolio in A and the remainder in B. Such a portfolio needs to be
adjusted from one period to the next to maintain this fraction.
As there are as many constant portfolios as numbers in the interval [0, 1], a direct
application of Theorem 2 is not possible. The trick is to pick a finite collection of
constant portfolios that ‘cover’ the set of all constant portfolio’s. If the collection is
large enough, one can guarantee that one of those portfolios has a growth rate close
to the average growth rate of the best constant portfolio.
Each constant portfolio can be represented by a single number in the interval [0, 1].
That number is the fraction of the portfolios wealth invested in stock A. Let Vt(x)
be the valueof the constant portfolio x at time t. Pick an integer k, exact value to be
specified later, and let F be the set of constant portfolios {1/k, 2/k, . . . , (k − 1)/k}.
Applying Theorem 2 we deduce the existence of investment scheme C with value Ct
at time t such that
lnCt
t
≥ max
x∈F
lnVt(x)− 1√
t
.
Let z be the constant portfolio in F with largest value and y be the constant portfolio
15In this special case, the 1√
t
term can be improved to 1t .
16The portfolio is assumed to have the same same starting wealth as we do.
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with largest value overall, i.e.,
Vt(y) = max
x∈[0,1]
Vt(x).
We show that the difference between lnVt(z)
t
and lnVt(y)
t
is small.
For any x ∈ [0, 1],
Vt(x) = Π
t
j=0[xAj + (1− x)Bj] = Πtj=0[Bj + x(Aj −Bj)].
Hence,
lnVt(x) =
t∑
j=0
ln(Bj + x(Aj −Bj)).
Choose r
k
closest to y. Then |y − r
k
| ≤ 1
k
. Now,
lnVt(y)− lnVt(z) ≤ lnVt(y)− lnVt(r/k).
The right hand side of this last inequality is just
t∑
j=0
[ln(Bj + y(Aj −Bj))− ln(Bj + (r/k)(Aj −Bj)].
Each term of the sum is
ln
Bj + y(Aj −Bj)
Bj + (r/k)(Aj −Bj) = ln
1 + y(Aj−Bj)
Bj
1 + (r/k)(Aj−Bj)
Bj
.
Suppose Aj − Bj ≥ 0, the argument is similar for the converse. ¿From the choice of
r, y ≤ r+1
k
. So
1 +
y(Aj −Bj)
Bj
≤ 1 + (r + 1)(Aj −Bj)
kBj
.
Hence
ln
1 + y(Aj−Bj)
Bj
1 + (r/k)(Aj−Bj)
Bj
≤ ln(1 +O(1/k)) ≤ O(1/k).
Therefore
lnVt(y)− lnVt(z) ≤
t∑
j=0
[ln(Bj + y(Aj −Bj))− ln(Bj + r(Aj −Bj)
k
)] ≤ O(t/k).
So, lnVt(y)
t
− lnVt(z)
t
≤ O( 1
k
). Thus, given any  > 0 we can choose k and t sufficiently
large such that
lnCt
t
≥ lnVt(y)
t
− .
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Again this argument is easily generalized to the case of more than two stocks.17
The main idea used in extending Theorem 2 to a continuum of schemes is that
the loss function be ‘smooth’. Suppose we can associate with each scheme F a point
x in a compact set with metric ρ, say. Let Lt(x) be the loss from using scheme x at
time t. If |Lt(x) − Lt(y)| ≤ O(ρ(x, y)) for all points x and y, then, by covering F
with a sufficiently fine grid of points we can mimic the argument above to show that
Theorem 2 holds.
3.5 The Exponential Weighted Algorithm
Many of the proofs of Theorem 2 have involved the use of an algorithm that selects a
decision in proportion to its loss with exponential weights. In this section we suggest
why this is a natural way way to prove Theorem 2.
Return again to the world of two stocks. Theorem 2 implied the existence of a
portfolio C whose value at time t satisfied:
lnCt
t
≥ max{ lnAt
t
,
lnBt
t
} −O( 1√
t
).
The portfolio that does this is the one that divides the current wealth between the
two stocks in proportion to the values of the individual stocks. Thus at time t, a
fraction
wt =
At−1
At−1 +Bt−1
of current wealth is invested in stock A. To see why this works, consider what happens
at t = 0. Since, A0 = B0 = 1 and initial wealth is 1, this portfolio invests $1/2 in A
and $1/2 in B. At time t = 1 this portfolio has value (A1 +B1)/2. The portfolio now
invests
A1
A1 +B1
(
A1 +B1
2
) =
A1
2
in stock A and the remainder, B1/2 in stock B. So, at time t = 2, the value of the
portfolio will be (A2 +B2)/2. Continuing in this fashion it is easy to see that
Ct =
At +Bt
2
.
17The dependence on k can be removed using a standard argument.
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Now, from the properties of the logarithm function we deduce that
lnCt = ln(
At +Bt
2
) ≥ max{lnAt, lnBt} − ln 2.
Dividing by t we obtain the required result.18
Now let us consider the more general setting. We have two schemes A and B. The
gain at time t from using scheme A and B are GAt and G
B
t respectively.
19 Assume
that GA0 = 0 = G
B
0 and all gains are bounded above by 1. The goal is to construct a
scheme C such that
T∑
t=0
GCt ≥ max{
T∑
t=0
GAt ,
T∑
t=0
GBt } − o(T ).
To do this we associate with scheme A a stock A′ whose value A′t at time t is Π
T
t=0x
GAt .
Similarly with scheme B. The number x > 1 will be chosen later. The advantage of
this construction is that
lnA′T = lnx
T∑
t=0
GAt
and
lnB′T = lnx
T∑
t=0
GBt .
Using the previous argument we construct a portfolio, C ′, that invests a fraction
wT =
x
∑T−1
t=0
GAt
x
∑T−1
t=0
GAt + x
∑T−1
t=0
GBt
of the wealth at time T in stock A′. Hence
lnC ′T ≥ lnxmax{
T∑
t=0
GAt ,
T∑
t=0
GBt } − o(T ).
Let C be the scheme that chooses scheme A at time t with probability wt. The trick
now is to use what we know about lnC ′t to prove that C is comparable to A and B.
Let at =
∑t
j=1G
A
j and bt =
∑t
j=1G
B
j . Then
wt =
xat−1
xat−1 + xat−1
,
18Notice we get the 1/t term rather than 1/
√
t.
19We focus on gains rather than losses. The reason will become clearer later.
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xat = xat−1xG
A
t ≤ xat−1(1 + (x− 1)GAt )
and
xbt = xbt−1xG
B
t ≤ xbt−1(1 + (x− 1)GBt ).
Hence
xat + xbt ≤ (xat−1 + xbt−1)[1 + (x− 1)(wtGAt + (1− wt)GBt )].
Using the fact that 1 + y ≤ ey we deduce that
xat + xbt ≤ (xat−1 + xbt−1)e(x−1)(wtGAt +(1−wt)GBt ).
Using this last inequality recursively we obtain
xat + xbt ≤ (xa0 + xb0)Πtj=1e(x−1)(wjG
A
j +(1−wj)GBj ).
Since a0 = 0 = b0 we get
xat + xbt ≤ 2Πtj=1e(x−1)(wjG
A
j +(1−wj)GBj ].
Taking logs and noting that
C ′t =
xat + xbt
2
we get
(x− 1)
t∑
j=1
(wjG
A
j + (1− wj)GBj ) ≥ lnC ′t.
Using what we know about C ′t we derive
T∑
j=1
(wjG
A
j + (1− wj)GBj ) ≥
lnx
x− 1 max{
T∑
t=0
GAt ,
T∑
t=0
GBt } − o(T ).
The left hand side of the above is the expected gain from using scheme C upto time
T . If we choose x = 1 + 1√
T
and use the fact that maximum gain in any period is 1,
we conclude:
t∑
j=1
(wjG
A
j + (1− wj)GBj ) ≥ max{
T∑
t=0
GAt ,
T∑
t=0
GBt } − o(T ).
There is one drawback to the exponential weighted majority algorithm. It relies
on a parameter, x, that depends on T . Thus, one must know ahead of time how many
periods the decision problem must run.
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4 Appendix: Approachability Theorem
Row (R) and Column (C) repeatedly meet to play a matrix game. If R chooses her
strategy i and C chooses his strategy j, the payoff is a vector vij in some compact
space.20 Let it and jt be the strategies chosen by R and C respectively in round t.
Both R and C are concerned with the long term average of the payoffs:
AT =
T∑
t=1
vitjt/T.
In the space in which the vector payoffs reside there is a convex set G, called the
target set. R’s goal is to play the game so as to force AT to approach G arbitrarily
closely almost surely. If R can succeed at approaching G, the set G is said to be
approachable.
In the case when G is a convex set, Blackwell [3] gave a necessary and sufficient
condition for a convex target set to be approachable.21 To describe the condition let
AT 6∈ G be the current average payoff and g the point in G closest to AT . Let l be the
plane perpendicular to the line joining AT and g that touches G. Such a plane can be
found by virtue of the separating hyperplane theorem. Suppose that C has a strategy
(possibly mixed) such that no matter what pure strategy R plays, the outcome is a
vector v on the same side of l as AT . In this case G is not approachable. However,
and this is the useful part of the theorem, if R has a mixed strategy so that no matter
what strategy C uses the outcome is a vector on the same side of l as G, then, G is
approachable. To see why such a conclusion is plausible, assume that T , the number
of rounds played so far, is very large. Let v be the payoff on the “right” side of l that
R can force in round T + 1. Then, the average payoff becomes T
T+1
AT + v/(T + 1).
Since v is on the other side of l from AT , it is not hard to see that the new average,
T
T+1
AT + v/(T + 1) is a little closer to G than AT was. So, to decide whether G is
approachable, it suffices to check whether R can force the outcome of the next round
of play to be on the “right” side of l. In many cases deciding this amounts to deciding
20More generally, the payoff can be a vector drawn from a distribution that depends on i and j.
The proof described here easily extends to this case.
21Blackwell’s original proof establishes convergence in probability only.
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whether a collection of linear inequalities is satisfied.
4.1 Proof of Blackwell’s approachability theorem
Suppose then that R can force the outcome of the next round of play to be on the
same side of l as G. We will show that the set G is approachable. Let D be the
largest distance between any two points in the set of possible payoffs.22 Let d(At, G)
be the distance from the current average At to the nearest point in G. Our goal is to
show that d(AT , G) goes to zero almost surely as T →∞. We do this by estimating
P (d(AT , G) ≥ δ) from above.
Let MT = T
2d(AT , G)
2 − 2TD2. We prove two things about MT . First, that it is
a super-martingale,i.e., ET (MT+1) ≤MT . Second, that |MT+1 −MT | ≤ (6T + 3)D2.
From these two facts we will show that d(AT , G) converges almost surely to zero.
Lemma 1 MT is a super-martingale.
Proof Let cT be the closest point to AT in the set G. Then,
d(AT+1, G) ≤ d(AT+1, cT )
By our assumption that R has a strategy wi to follow, we know that for all j
(
∑
i
wT+1i vi,jT+1 − cT )′(AT − cT ) ≤ 0.
Let aT+1 =
∑
iwivi,j. Thus,
d(AT+1, cT )
2 = (AT+1 − cT )2
= (
T
T + 1
AT +
1
T
aT+1 − cT )2
= (
T
T + 1
AT − T
T + 1
cT )
2 +
2(
T
T + 1
AT − T
T + 1
cT )
′(
1
T
(aT+1 − cT ) +
(
1
T
(aT+1 − cT ))2
22This is finite by compactness.
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≤
(
T
T + 1
)2
d(AT , cT ) + (
1
T
(aT+1 − cT ))2
≤
(
T
T + 1
)2
d(AT , G) +
D2
T 2
Thus,
(T + 1)2d(AT+1, G)
2 ≤ T 2d(AT , G)2 +
(
T + 1
T
)2
D2
Bounding T+1
T
by the crude bound of 2, we get:
(T + 1)2d(AT+1, G)
2 ≤ T 2d(AT , G)2 + 4D2
Writing this in terms of MT we get:
ET (MT+1) = E
T ((T + 1)2d(LT+1, G)
2 − 4(T + 1)D2)
≤ ET (T 2d(LT , G)2 + 4D2 − 4(T + 1)D2)
= ET (T 2d(LT , G)
2 − 4TD2)
= ET (MT )
= MT
2
Lemma 2 |MT+1 −MT | ≤ (6T + 3)D2.
Proof Note that |AT+1 − AT | ≤ D/T . By convexity the closest point in G
to AT+1 is no more than distance D/T from the closest point in G to AT , i.e.,
|cT+1− cT | ≤ D/T . By using the triangle inequality twice we see that, |d(AT+1, G)−
d(AT , G)| ≤ 2D/T . Hence:
MT+1−MT = (2T+1)d(AT+1, G)2+T 2(d(AT+1, G)−d(AT , G))(d(AT+1, G)+d(AT , G))−2D2
Thus,
|MT+1 −MT | ≤ (2T + 1)D2 + 4T 2D2/T + 2D2 = (6T + 3)D2
2
Lemma 3 d(At, G)→ 0 almost surely as T →∞.
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Proof Let St =
MT
(6T+3)D2
=
∑T
t=1Xt where each Xt =
Mt−Mt−1
(6T+3)D2
has expectation
less than zero and |Xt| ≤ 6t+36T+3 ≤ 1. We now want to show that P (MT ≥ T ) goes
exponentially fast to zero.
First note that
ey ≤ 1 + y + y2
if y ≤ 1. So,
Et−1(eαXt) ≤ 1 + αEt−1(Xt) + α2Et−1((Xt)2)
if α ≤ 1. Plugging in what we know about Xt,
Et−1(eαXt) ≤ 1 + α2
Now,
P (ST ≥ T ) = P (eαST ≥ eαT )
≤ E(e
αST )
eαT
=
E(
∏T
t=1 e
αXt)
eαT
=
∏T
t=1E
t−1(eαXt)
eαT
≤
∏T
t=1(1 + α
2
eαT
≤ (1 + α
2)T
eαT
≤ e
α2T
eαT
= eα(α−)T
If we take α = /2, then
P (MT ≥ T (6T + 3)D2) = P (ST ≥ T ) ≤ e−2T/2
Now substituting in the definition of MT we get:
P [T 2d(At, G)
2 − 2TD2 ≥ T (6T + 3)D2] ≤ e−2T/2
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Which solves out to:
P [d(At, G)
2 ≥ 2D2/T + (6 + 3/T )D2] ≤ e−2T/2
For sufficiently large T , 2D2/T + (6 + 3/T )D2 < 7D2, then taking  = δ2/(7D2) we
get
P (d(At, G)
2 ≥ δ2) ≤ e− δ
4T
98D4
so
P (d(At, G) ≥ δ) ≤ e−
δ4T
98D4
Thus, the probability of d(AT , G) being bigger than δ goes to zero exponentially fast.
2.
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